Military, diplomatic, energy and financial support. This is what the president of Ukraine is looking for, Volodímir Zelenskion his European tour to continue standing up against his enemy, Vladimir Putin.
In Madrid, Pedro Sanchez has signed 817 million in aid to Ukraine to support its Army, its civilian population and its reconstruction. Among them are more than 215 million through SAFE (the European Instrument of Action for the Security of Europe), to pay for the production of radars and surveillance. In this context, Zelensky met in Madrid with the Spanish company Indrawhich showed him the LTR-25 air surveillance radar and the Aracne anti-drone system.
Türkiye was added at the last minute to Zelensky’s tour, which arrives in Ankara on Wednesday, hours after Washington’s special envoy landed. Steve Witkoffand after closing agreements on Spanish technology, Greek gas and French fighters, to remind friends, enemies and skeptics that, four years after the start of the Russian invasion, Ukraine continues to resist and intends to decide how – and with whom – the end of this war is signed.
Ankara is not an exotic stop, but the chosen setting to explore, under the umbrella of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and with an eye on the environment Donald Trumpwhat a future negotiation could be like without disarming Ukraine in the middle of the war. Erdoğan, who maintains good relations with kyiv, Moscow and Washington, is the only mediator who can achieve a negotiated solution.
The Turkish leader, in full autocratic drift domestically, hopes to use Zelensky’s visit to consolidate himself as essential, reinforce his political and naval control over the Black Sea, deepen military and reconstruction cooperation with Ukraine—without breaking with Russia—and place himself within the new European security scheme as an indispensable actor. All of this wrapped in a setting that presents him to public opinion as the statesman who speaks to everyone.
As the Chatham House researcher has defined Galip DalaiAnkara’s line is “pro-kyiv, without being openly anti-Moscow,” and it has provided military support to Ukraine without breaking with Russia. Erdoğan lives in a paradox: respected mediator abroad, autocrat at home, with the lowest support in his more than two decades in office, in part due to a self-inflicted economic crisis, while further eroding what remains of democracy with the arrest of opposition party leaders. The international role of referee gives it internal legitimacy.
For his part, Zelensky is in his lowest hours, but he is still essential. The corruption crisis that shakes its environment, known as Operation Midas, with the focus on Andriy Yermak – head of the presidential office and true number two in power – has opened an internal breach.
Yermak is a faithful friend of Zelensky for whom he is compromising his leadership. It is assumed that the president will intervene before the Rada (the Ukrainian Parliament) and “heads will roll”, probably starting with Yermak, at the request of the presidential party’s own deputies.
In the Russian political ecosystem this is interpreted as an opportunity: if the idea that the Ukrainian government is corrupt crystallizes in Washington and European capitals, it becomes easier to question the shipment of weapons and, above all, money. Moscow “rubs its hands,” says an analyst from Russia, because a Ukraine singled out by its allies is a more vulnerable Ukraine on the battlefield and at the negotiating table.
In the background is Trump, back in the White House and with the pending account of the episodes related to Hunter Biden and his businesses in Ukraine in 2019. Trump has it in for Zelensky and Washington has political ammunition—investigations, suspicions of coercion or corruption—with which to pressure him.
From this perspective, Zelensky’s tour is also an attempt to demonstrate that he is still useful, presentable and necessary for the West.
What Ukraine is looking for
Before Turkey, Zelensky has visited three capitals with very clear objectives.
In France, the long military term has been tied up. Paris has committed to a package that includes the future acquisition of up to 100 Rafale fighters and new air defense systems, as well as drones and interceptors. It is the skeleton of a Ukrainian air force integrated into the Western ecosystem. In exchange, France secures decades of contracts for its defense industry and establishes itself as the architect of the security guarantees that Europe promises to kyiv.
In Spain, the emphasis is on the short and medium term: air defense, radars and anti-drone systems, precisely what Ukraine needs to survive the Russian bombings this winter and protect its critical infrastructure. Madrid had already committed to a significant volume of military aid by 2025; Now the visit allows us to visualize that commitment and link it to the Spanish industry, with companies like Indra well positioned in sensors and electronic warfare.
Spain, in return, gains weight as a security actor on the eastern flank and reserves a place in the future reconstruction.
In Greece, the objective is energy. Russian attacks have destroyed much of Ukraine’s domestic gas production. kyiv is being forced to draw on reserves and import gas that enters as LNG through European ports, including Alexandropolis, and is re-exported by gas pipeline to Ukraine.
The agreement announced in Athens seeks precisely that: to use the EU’s network of terminals and pipelines to ensure that Ukraine does not run out of power in the middle of winter, while Greece is projected as hub regional LNG. Zelensky gets gas and security of supply; Kyriakos Mitsotakisprominence and contracts.
Türkiye as mediator and test scenario
For analysts like Yevgeniya Gaber o Elijah Kusathe kyiv–Ankara relationship is much more than an exchange of Bayraktar drones for Ukrainian engines: it is an asymmetric strategic alliance. Turkey is a member of NATO, but acts autonomously, controls access to the Black Sea through the straits and has hosted the few serious negotiations between Russia and Ukraine since 2022.
The Black Sea is one of the centers of gravity of this war: coveted by Russia for its military projection against Ukraine, the Mediterranean and NATO, and vital for Ukraine as an export route for 90% of its grain. Dominating this basin conditions the security of Ukraine, the Balkans, the Caucasus and part of the Mediterranean. Turkey, which controls the straits, has been a key actor: the closure of the passage to Russian warships has limited reinforcements to the Black Sea fleet, and Ankara has become an inevitable mediator.
Erdoğan is the third way. The Turkish leader, an expert in diplomatic juggling, talks to everyone, plays twenty sides and has his own geopolitical interests in the Black Sea, the Caucasus and the Middle East. Türkiye is the only realistic mediator capable of bringing the parties together.
The meeting between Zelensky and Witkoff, leaked by Turkish media, has provoked the irritation of the Kremlin spokesman, Dmitri Peskovupon learning that Moscow has not been invited.
For the Ukrainian leader, Türkiye fulfills several simultaneous functions. It is a negotiation scenario where kyiv is willing to explore a political solution under Turkish sponsorship, without appearing to be a capitulation to Moscow. And it also represents a channel of communication and testing with Trumpism, avoiding another toxic embarrassment like the one another meeting in Washington would have.
Zelensky tries to ensure that Trump does not see him only as the man who did not help him against Biden, and that Moscow understands that kyiv still has relevant friends in NATO.
For the Ukrainian leader, Türkiye fulfills several functions. It is a scenario where kyiv can explore a political solution under Turkish patronage without appearing to capitulate to Moscow. Zelensky wants Trump not to see him only as the man who denied him help against Biden and for the Kremlin to verify that kyiv retains relevant allies in NATO.
The corruption accusations are the culmination of months of demands for “peace” by Putin, which imply that Ukraine gives up large occupied areas (Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson). This “exchange of some lands” has had the support of Trump since August, and even the Brazilian president Lula da Silva It was added at the time to the Crimean concession.
Seen from Moscow, the trip to Türkiye is a symptom of weakness: a Zelensky cornered by corruption and violated by Trump’s hostility who seeks refuge under the wing of Erdoğan. From kyiv, on the other hand, it is an attempt to gain time, diversify support and prepare the ground for an eventual negotiation. But Zelensky will not leave while the war lasts. This tour is part of their survival.