Today, November 21, was supposed to be the day that US sanctions against Rosneft and Lukoil, two giant Russian oil and gas conglomerates, were supposed to come into force. This decision by President Donald Trump, taken a month ago, was recently changed with regard to Lukoil. The company now has until December 13 to sell its external assets and until April next year to cease all its activities in Bulgaria. There are several firms interested in purchasing the assets in question, but the transactions can only be finalized after approval from the Trump administration.
Lukoil, a private company listed on the stock exchanges, is a global colossus. Most of its operations take place outside Russia. The profits and dividends it makes weigh heavily on the Russian economy. The decision taken by Washington puts Lukoil’s survival into question.
For its part, Rosneft, a company controlled by the Kremlin, is the largest contributor to the budget of the Russian Federation. The sanctions, if they become effective, will have a significant impact on the country’s public finances.
The question that remains unanswered for now is clear: will the loss of revenue and the resulting budgetary imbalances be enough to convince the Kremlin that there is urgency in terms of peace negotiations? That is Trump’s intention. Experience tells me that such a hypothesis is unlikely. Sanctions alone have a time-consuming impact on the policies they aim to change.
I defend, however, the application of sanctions against regimes that act outside international law. In this specific case, it is about significantly reducing the financial base and other means that allow Russia to continue its unacceptable aggression against Ukraine. And to express a strong political message, of absolute condemnation.
There are no conditions for the UN Security Council to approve any sanctions package targeting Russia. This would initially be the appropriate process. If this is not possible, it is up to each State to decide on the restrictions and pressure it is ready to exert. It must, however, respect humanitarian principles – sanctions cannot jeopardize the lives of citizens of the targeted country – and the sovereignty of third states. They must also aim to contribute to the resolution of the crisis or conflict, and in this case to stop the unjustifiable war for which Russia is responsible.
I am of the opinion that neither the ceasefire, nor peace, are part of Vladimir Putin’s most immediate plans. On the contrary, it would seem that we will continue to witness the intensification of destruction and death in Ukraine with Russian approval. The Kremlin is betting on war and is convinced that it will eventually subdue Ukraine. Information reaching us from Moscow indicates that Putin is listening less and less to diplomats, including Sergey Lavrov. Its main advisors come from the political police apparatus and the economic sphere. See who will represent him at the G20 summit, this weekend in South Africa: it will not be the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lavrov, but rather the Deputy Head of the Executive Office of the Presidency, Maxim Oreshkin. He is an apparatchik with a past entirely linked to managing the national economy. Concern about the stability of the economy is a priority for Putin. This confirms the importance of sanctions in the economic and financial areas.
Putin is desperate for a victory that will include his name in the history books of the “great and holy” Russia, as he likes to say. His statements, rattled off exhaustively by the group that controls power and the media in Moscow, reveal a leader who only accepts negotiating with the greats of this world – Donald Trump and Xi Jinping. The others are seen as minor actors, with no value in the international geopolitical chessboard. Putin does not want to waste time in dialogues with European leaders.
The EU must respond on three fronts: maintain aid to Ukraine, rigorously apply the sanctions already approved and show its readiness to begin a process of serious talks with Russian leaders.
Regarding the talks, my suggestion is simple: António Costa, as president of the European Council, must receive a mandate from the member states that gives him the necessary authority to contact Putin. His office would then seek to establish lines of communication with the Kremlin, in order to convince the Russians that a cycle of talks between Putin and Costa could be beneficial for both parties and vital for the internal interests of the Russian Federation, and for peace in Europe.
There is urgency to move forward on this front, before the US and Russia reach an agreement over Europe’s heads and interests. This hypothesis is increasingly plausible, some will say.
All without illusions and with a lot of perseverance, on the European side. The messages coming from the Kremlin show that Putin sees any possible negotiation as an exercise in affirming his views and ambitions. For him, flexibility, concessions, the search for balance, all of this is equivalent to weakness and the admission of mistakes, whether one’s own or others. This attitude cannot discourage the European side. The EU has to put on its bootstraps and enter the geopolitical game, in the only arena that is its own, the big league. There is a historic opportunity and demand here.
International security advisor. Former UN Deputy Secretary-General