The Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahumet this Monday in Jerusalem with his counterparts from Greece and Cyprus to deepen the relationship between the three countries, promote a commercial alliance in the Mediterranean… and address the issue of Turkish expansionism.
Ultimately, beyond the military and energy agreements, what unites the three countries is precisely their resentment towards Recep Tayyip Erdoganwho has met in recent months with Donald Trump and with Vladimir Putinin addition to being a key piece in the Ukraine puzzle due to its access to the Black Sea.
When too many things move at the same time, it is difficult to constantly follow the same narrative. It is easy to say that relations between Israel and the United States are excellent because American foreign policy has always focused on the defense of the Jewish state. Now, Netanyahu has reason to distrust the White House.
His relationship with Trump is very hurt from the billionaire’s first term, when Israel tried to annex a good part of the West Bank without permission from the White House and ignoring the so-called Trump Plan, aimed at a two-state solution to the Palestinian question.
To this we must add, on the one hand, the excellent relationship of the current White House with the Arab monarchies and, on the other, the total respect that, as we say, Trump feels towards Erdogan.
Although in recent days, Israel has been insisting on the need to once again put the fight against Iran at the forefront, the truth is that there is enormous pressure from the United States and other Western and Arab countries for Israel to start working on the second part of the agreement with Hamas and give way to an international force that will lead to a provisional government in the Strip.
Ties between Hamas and Türkiye
The problem Netanyahu has with this second phase is that he is not interested at all. He never has. Of Trump’s famous twenty points, Israel reluctantly accepted those that had to do with the ceasefire in exchange for the release of the hostages still held by Hamas.
The rest is what matters most to the United States, which wants to normalize relations throughout the Middle East as soon as possible, keep Saudi Arabia as an ally and turn Gaza into a prosperous place to invest… but it is what is of least interest to both the terrorist group and Israel.
Israel, or specifically its prime minister, although it is a fairly widespread position in Hebrew society, is completely opposed to the two-state solution at this time… although it was not so on other occasions.
They understand that Gaza cannot be independent, obviously, with Hamas at the helm… but they are also afraid that prosperity in the Palestinian area could lead to the formation of their own state. On the part of Hamas, the explanation is logical: they do not want to give up power under any circumstances.
The president of Türkiye, the Islamist Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Reuters
What does Türkiye have to do with this? Well, along with Qatar and Iran, the Erdoğan government has been one of the main sponsors of Hamas in the Gaza Strip.
Türkiye currently does not maintain commercial or diplomatic relations with Israel and even closed its air and maritime space after the response to the attacks of October 7, 2023.
Just this week, the Israeli government refused to allow Ankara to participate in discussions about the international force that is supposed to impose the new order in Gaza.
The electric cable and the “joint reaction force”
The ideal for Netanyahu would be to find a way to weaken Turkey and slow down its Islamist drift, but that will not be possible if Erdoğan has the support of both Russia and the United States. He is the ideal ally because he barely creates problems—at the moment—and does not take a clear position in any dispute.
Istanbul was the headquarters that Russia chose for its first negotiations with Ukraine shortly after the 2022 invasion began… and, in turn, Turkey is a NATO country with what that implies in terms of weapons and diplomatic ties.
In the absence of that magic solution, Israel’s rapprochement with Greece and Cyprus is a matter of pure necessity.
The two States are members of the European Union and both share the fear of the Turkish threat: after all, Greece did not achieve its independence from Istanbul until 1825, after 400 years under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, and part of the island of Cyprus is in the direct orbit of Turkey, although right now the Government is chaired by the Greek Cypriot Nikos Christodoulidis.
Of course, beyond the union against Türkiye, there are issues of economic collaboration that are of vital importance for the three countries; in particular, the electricity interconnection cable that would link Israel with Europe through these countries and that would represent a very important alternative for the Jewish State to the always complicated business with its Arab neighbors.
Military cooperation is also fluid: the three countries have agreed on a “joint reaction force” in the event of an attack on any of them, which numbers around 2,500 men; In addition, the pilots of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) train in Greek airspace and their soldiers train in Cypriot territory.
In the event that, at some point, the United States – whether with this Administration or any other – stops being that preferred ally, Israel needs parallel paths so as not to remain isolated.
It is not exactly a message to Trump, but it is the confirmation that US aid can at least be completed with other allies. Taking into account Israel’s current diplomatic situation, even within the European Union itself, any progress in this regard is decisive for the Tel Aviv Government.