Niall Ferguson, during a conference at the World Economic Forum.


According to sources consulted by The Washington PostChina would be working on expanding its nuclear testing base in the Lop Nor desert (Xinjiang), in the west of the country, with the presumed purpose of resuming tests that have been stopped since 1996.

Satellite images indicate abnormal activity in recent weeks, with signs of construction of more tunnels and explosion chambers that could be a response to the reckless statements of the American president, Donald Trumpon his social network Truth.

Last Thursday, October 30, Trump ordered the Pentagon online to resume nuclear testing… since Russia and China were already doing it. Everything in that message was a huge misunderstanding – or a huge hoax, to choose -: first of all, these types of orders are not given through social networks unless one is the president of El Salvador. Second, neither Russia nor China have tested a nuclear weapon in 29 years.

It is true that Russia has been fantasizing about it for at least four years and constantly threatening, but its tests have always been with conventional weapons.

Without knowing if the message responded to an irrepressible impulse—this is not the first time that Trump has announced something on the Internet that then came to nothing—or it was the result of a thoughtful decision, the snowball immediately began to gain strength. From Moscow, Kremlin bigwigs, including the former president Dmitri Medvédev and to himself Vladimir Putinannounced that they were raising the nuclear alert and that they were taking the US threat seriously, reserving the right to resume their own nuclear tests when they deemed it appropriate.

Now, the White House is faced with a compromised decision. Trump published the message without consulting anyone; The Secretary of Energy seems to be against this measure, but the president insisted this past Friday on the need to resume the nuclear program as long as Russia and China did the same.

As can be seen, we are facing a kind of vicious circle in which the three great powers seem to look to each other for a justification to do what they have probably been considering for some time.

A return to the Cold War?

It must be remembered that in the same 1996 in which China and France carried out their last nuclear weapons tests, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) came into force.

The great powers have since maintained a confusing relationship regarding the agreement: China and the United States have not ratified it, although in practice they have followed its guidelines. Russia signed it, but announced its non-ratification in 2023, although it maintains its willingness to return to it as soon as possible.

We are talking, then, about thousands of stacked nuclear warheads whose exact status has been unknown for three decades. At a time of extreme international tension, it is logical to think that everyone wants to check that their arsenals are working perfectly. After the end of the Cold War, it was assumed that a nuclear confrontation was impossible, but Russian threats have revived fears around the world.

The resumption of tests – something that, it must be insisted, the three powers have announced but none has yet put into practice – also does not represent an escalation other than rhetoric. If only 1% of its nuclear bombs worked correctly, the end of civilization as we understand it would be guaranteed.

The tests are nothing more than a reminder to others that mutually assured destruction is still in effect.

Ukraine as a mirror of Taiwan

China could also have extra motivation. Russia’s failure in Ukraine has not been able to go unnoticed in Beijing, which has reunification with Taiwan – that is, its invasion – as a short-medium term objective. The inability of the Russian army to advance by conventional means towards its objective, finding itself involved in a bloody four-year war with no solution in sight, makes the nuclear temptation increasingly greater.

A temptation that the Kremlin itself experienced in the fall of 2022, when it planned the use of tactical nuclear weapons on Ukrainian soil, although both international pressure and the realization that the military gains were going to be negligible compared to the diplomatic damage caused it to abandon the original plan.

China may feel the need to expand its arsenal and demonstrate its capacity – it is estimated that by 2030 it could have around 1,000 nuclear warheads compared to the more than 5,000 of Russia and the United States – to increase its regional power. The issue, again, is what to do with them later.

Because we are not in 1945, and the launching of a single nuclear bomb at a third country would immediately provoke a response from the rest. China cannot attempt to resolve its territorial problems in that hornet’s nest that is the Pacific Ocean through unconventional attacks without risking a US or even Russian counterattack if its territory is affected.

In fact, thinking about attacking Taiwan with a nuclear weapon sounds so disproportionate that the subsequent tsunamis and the radioactive waves themselves could cause enormous damage to all neighboring countries.

Thus, everything that is happening must be understood in terms of measuring forces rather than escalation itself. More than anything because, in nuclear terms, there are no degrees: either all or nothing. China has always argued that a nuclear war “cannot be won” and, therefore, should not be started under any circumstances. It thus reflects its eminent practical nature. Another thing is that he is going to sit idly by while others flirt with recklessness.

That would be showing a weakness that Xi Jinping is not willing to concede.

Source link

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *