The growing tension between security and civil liberties is today at the center of the European debate. Each new threat, be it terrorism, cybercrime or disinformation, motivates a reinforcement of surveillance mechanisms, border control and data sharing between States. The new European Internal Security Strategy (ProtectEU), presented in 2025, promises greater protection, but raises the classic dilemma: what price do we pay for this security, especially in Portugal?
Security vs. freedom: an unstable balance
Since the September 11 attacks and attacks in Europe, the European Union has advanced joint security policies. The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, reaffirmed that security is essential for free and prosperous societies (European Commission, 2025). However, in practice, this balance is fragile. Security measures often imply greater surveillance, data collection and control, raising concerns about privacy and the risk of eroding trust in institutions.
Studies show that excessive security can have the opposite effect: reducing public trust and harming social cohesion. When people feel that they are under constant surveillance, they question the authorities’ intentions and may resist imposed measures, even if well-intentioned.
From free movement to shared surveillance
The Schengen Agreements have allowed Europeans unprecedented mobility. In return, they demanded transnational police cooperation. Portugal adapted, sharing data and integrating into systems such as the SIS (Schengen Information System). The Lisbon Treaty in 2009 reinforced this path, creating common justice and home affairs policies. The creation of Europol and Frontex consolidated this shared security system.
With ProtectEU, the EU aims to standardize the fight against threats such as terrorism, organized crime, cybercrime and even hybrid threats. The plan foresees new police technologies, strengthening of Europol and involvement of civil society and the private sector in security (European Commission, 2025). However, these decisions are often taken in Brussels without broad public debate in member states.
Portugal follows this European rhythm, but not always with proportional reflection or scrutiny. There is a real risk of importing solutions that do not fit the national context, creating tension between security and civil rights.
The case of Lisbon: cameras, data and surveillance
In Lisbon, video surveillance has grown significantly. A 2023 protocol between the City Council and the PSP foresees more than 200 new councils in 16 areas of the city, including Cais do Sodré, Restauradores and Campo das Cebolas (Lisbon City Council, 2023). By the end of 2025, the total number of cameras will exceed 240 (Tavares, 2025).
The president of the municipality, Carlos Moedas, defends the measure as video protection, ensuring that the system respects privacy and personal data. However, the population expresses doubts: who accesses the images? For what purposes? How many crimes were actually prevented? Without transparency, the risk of public rejection increases. The fear of living in an urban space that is permanently monitored is legitimate.
Furthermore, measures like these, presented as neutral, tend to affect vulnerable groups unequally. There is a risk of racial profiling or reinforcement of discriminatory practices, especially in neighborhoods with a greater presence of minorities or fewer resources.
Internal borders: when the exception becomes the rule
Temporary suspension of free movement has also become more common. At events such as World Youth Day 2023, Portugal reintroduced border controls for around two weeks. More than 500 thousand people were inspected and 83 entry refusals were recorded (Contacto, 2023; Sol, 2023).
These measures, justified to protect large events, show how the Schengen principle can be relaxed in the name of security. However, if applied frequently or without clear criteria, they can become normal, undermining confidence in freedom of movement, one of the pillars of the EU.
Metadata: the Portuguese case and the Constitutional Court
The Portuguese Parliament’s attempt to legislate on access to communications metadata demonstrated the risk of legislating without public participation. The first law, approved in 2021, allowed broad access to telephone and internet records. It was considered unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court for violating the right to privacy (Morais Leitão, 2023).
A second version, in 2023, was again rejected. In these cases, the lack of debate with experts and civil society proved to be harmful. The security rush led to bad legal results and delays. The example shows that protecting citizens requires not only speed, but also consideration, transparency and respect for fundamental rights.
Security as collective well-being
Security must be understood, like health, as an essential dimension of collective well-being. A community in constant fear becomes ill: emotionally, socially, politically. Therefore, preventive policies are more effective than repressive responses.
Investments in safe public spaces, inclusion policies, civic education, support for young people and integration of immigrants are more sustainable strategies than widespread surveillance systems. These approaches not only prevent crime, but also reinforce the sense of community belonging and responsibility.
The COVID-19 pandemic has proven the interdependence between public health and safety. Countries that relied on mutual trust and clear communication were more effective. The same applies to homeland security: without social trust, no strategy will work in a lasting way.
The new European strategy recognizes this. The concept of the “Preparedness Union” and the “European Shield of Democracy” project point to a more integrated approach (European Commission, 2025). Security must protect democratic values, not replace them.
Trust and inclusion: foundations of effective security
Institutional trust is not built by decree. It requires accountability, legal guarantees and transparency. If the population believes that it is protected within constitutional limits, it will be more accepting of extraordinary measures. The absence of trust, on the contrary, fuels fear, apathy and distrust.
Security policies also need to be inclusive. They cannot be designed in isolated offices in Brussels or Lisbon. They need to listen to local voices: technicians, community leaders, jurists, citizens. Co-authorship generates legitimacy and effectiveness. Measures imposed from above risk being ignored or rejected.
European experiences show that policies copy-paste between countries with different realities often fail. Portugal does not have the same challenges as Hungary or Sweden. Lisbon does not have the same contexts as Bragança. Adapting policies to concrete reality is a sign of strategic intelligence.
It is therefore important that the State is transparent about the measures it applies, explaining from the beginning their objectives, their limits and the impacts they may have. Before legislating on sensitive topics such as surveillance or data collection, it is essential to promote public consultations, informed debates and listen to civil society. Scrupulously respecting the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution and the Charter of Rights of the European Union must always be the starting point. Measures that call them into question become counterproductive.
Likewise, it is necessary to ensure that each country, and even each city, has room to adapt European strategies to their concrete reality, avoiding unique solutions that ignore cultural, social and institutional diversity. And, finally, it is essential to create independent monitoring mechanisms and regularly present concrete results to the population, both on the benefits obtained and on the adjustments that must be made.
Conclusion: security that protects and does not imprison
Portugal has the challenge of balancing European demands with its social and historical specificities. Fear of crime cannot be replaced by fear of the State. Worthwhile security is that which reinforces trust and cohesion, not erodes them.
The question to ask with each new measure should be simple: does this make us safer without making us less free? If the answer is positive and proven, you will have support. If it is not clear, it needs debate. Security and freedom must be allies, not adversaries. Portugal, as a mature democratic society, has a duty to ensure that protection is never synonymous with excessive surveillance, but rather with a free and safe space for everyone.
Degree in Security Studies (ULHT) | PhD student in International Relations (ISCSP-UL) | Criminal Investigator Specialist in International Police Cooperation (DIC-PSP)
References
Lisbon City Council. (2023). Video protection system reinforces security in Lisbon. https://informacao.lisboa.pt/noticias/detalhe/sistema-de-video-protecao-reforca-seguranca-em-lisboa
European Commission. (2025a). ProtectEU: European Commission presents new European Internal Security Strategy. https://portugal.representation.ec.europa.eu/news/protecteu
Contact. (2023). 83 people were refused entry at Portuguese borders. https://www.contacto.lu/portugal/recusada-a-entrada-a-83-pessoas
Morais Leitão. (2023). Legal Alert: Change in the regulation of access to metadata relating to electronic communications for criminal investigation purposes. https://www.mlgts.pt
Sun. (2023). Border control is resumed on July 22nd due to the working hours. https://sol.sapo.pt/2023/07/14/controlo-de-fronteiras-e-reposto
Tavares, I. (2025, January 23). Lisbon will install another 216 video surveillance cameras by the end of the year. Know where. 24 News.